We shall first construct by ordinary recursion method subsets to the set D of Gödel numbers of the sentences of a language L. That language is formed by the sentences of a fully interpreted formal language L, called an MA language, and sentences containing a monadic predicate letter T . From the class of the constructed subsets of D we extract one set U by transfinite recursion method. Interpret those sentences whose Gödel numbers are in U as true, and their negations as false. These sentences together form an MA language. It is a sublanguage of L having L as its sublanguage, and T is its truth predicate.
Introduction
In [4] a theory of truth is defined for certain sublanguages of a language L which is the first order language L = {∈} of set theory augmented by a monadic predicate T . The interpretation of L is determined by the minimal model M constructed in [2] for ZF set theory. This interpretation makes L fully interpreted, i.e., its sentences are either true or false. The sublanguages for which a theory of truth is defined belong to a class of sublanguages of L. Languages of that class are denoted by L U , where U is a subset of the set D of the Gödel numbers of sentences of L. The Gödel numbers of sentences of L U belong to the set G(U) ∪ F (U), where the subsets G(U) and F (U) of D are told to satisfy the following rules ('iff' abbreviates 'if and only if'):
(r1) If A is a sentence of L, then the Gödel number #A of A is in G(U) iff A is true in the interpretation of L, and in F (U) iff A is false in the interpretation of L.
(r2) Let n be a numeral. #T (n) is in G(U) iff n is the numeral ⌈A⌉ of the Gödel number of a sentence A of L and #A is in U. #T (n) is in F (U) iff n = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #[¬A] is in U.
In the next rules (r3)-(r7) A and B denote sentences of L.
(r3) Negation rule: #[¬A] is in G(U) iff #A is in F (U), and in F (U) iff #A is in G(U).
(r4) Disjunction rule: #[A ∨ B] is in G(U) iff #A or #B is in G(U), and in F (U) iff #A and #B are in F (U). 
(r6) Implication rule: #[A → B] is in G(U) iff #A is in F (U) or #B is in G(U). #[A → B]
is in F (U) iff #A is in G(U) and #B is in F (U).
(r7) Biconditionality rule: #[A ↔ B] is in G(U) iff #A and #B are both in G(U) or both in F (U), and in F (U) iff #A is in G(U) and #B is in F (U) or #A is in F (U) and #B is in G(U).
Assuming that the set X of numerals of Gödel numbers of sentences of L is the intended domain of discourse for T , the following rules are presented for ∃xT (x) and ∀xT (x):
In [5] the above considerations are extended to the case when the language L is assumed to be mathematically agreeable (shortly MA). By Chomsky's definition (cf. [1] ) a "language is a set (finite or infinite) of sentences of finite length, and constructed out of finite sets of symbols". Allowing also countable sets of symbols, we say that L is an MA language if it satisfies the following conditions.
(i) The syntax of L contains a countable syntax of the first-order predicate logic with equality (cf., e.g., [6, II.5] ), natural numbers in variables and their names, numerals in terms.
(ii) L is fully interpreted.
(iii) Classical truth tables (cf. e.g., [6, p.3] ) are valid for the logical connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, → and ↔ of sentences of L.
(iv) Classical rules of truth hold for ∀xP (x) and ∃xP (x) where P is a predicate of L. Any countable first-order formal language, equipped with a consistent theory interpreted by a countable model, and containing natural numbers and numerals, is an MA language. A classical example is the language of arithmetic with its standard model and interpretation. Basic ingredients in the approach of [5] are:
1. An MA language L (base language). 2. A monadic predicate letter T . 3. The language L, which has sentences of L, T (n), where n is a numeral, ∀xT (x) and ∃xT (x) as its basic sentences, and which is closed under logical connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, → and ↔. 4. The set D of Gödel numbers of sentences of L in its fixed Gödel numbering. Neither in [4] nor in [5] the sets G(U) and F (U) satisfying rules (r1)-(r9) are shown to exist. Our main task is to construct sets G(U) and F (U), and prove that they satisfy rules (r1)-(r9), and the following rules when #[∃x¬T (x)] and #[∀x¬T (x)] are added to basic sentences of L.
Because of the recursive construction of sets G(U) we revise proofs given in [4, 5] for properties of sets G(U) and F (U). Some of them are used in [4, Theorem 4.1] to prove by transfinite recursion method the existence of consistent fixed points U of G, i.e., subsets U of D which satisfy U = G(U), and for no sentence A of L the Gödel numbers of both A and ¬A are in U. Among them there is the smallest one which is contained in every consistent fixed point of G.
To the smallest consistent fixed point U of G there corresponds a sublanguage L 0 of L which has G(U) ∪ F (U) as the set of Gödel numbers of its sentences. As in [4, 5] , define an interpretation for sentences of L 0 as follows. A sentence A of L 0 is interpreted as true iff its Gödel number #A is in G(U), and as false iff #A is in F (U). The so defined theory of truth for L 0 is shown in [4, Theorem 3.1] to conform well with the eight norms presented for theories of truth in [7] . T is called a truth predicate for L 0 , because T -biconditionality: 
Recursive construction of sets G(U )
Let L, T , L and D be as in the Introduction, and let W denote the set of Gödel numbers of all those sentences of L which are true in the interpretation of L. Given a subset U of D, denote
We shall construct subsets G n (U), n ∈ N 0 , of D recursively as follows. Define
Let A and B denote sentences of L. When n ∈ N 0 , and G n (U) is defined, denote 
and define
Because L is closed with respect to connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, → and ↔, it follows from the above construction that G n (U) is defined for every n ∈ N 0 . Moreover,
(U) for all n ∈ N 0 and k = 1, . . . , 9. In particular, we can define
Validity of rules (r1)-(r11)
Now we are ready to prove our main result.
Theorem 3.1. Let U be a subset of D, and let the subsets G(U) and F (U) of D be defined by (2.5), and by
Then rules (r1)-(r11) are valid.
Proof. Let A be a sentence of L. It follows from the construction of
Because L is an MA language, then ¬A is true in the interpretation of L iff A is false in the interpretation of L. This proves (r1). Let n be a numeral. The construction of G(U) implies that #T (n) is in G(U) iff it is in D 1 (U), i.e., iff n = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #A is in U.
This ends the proof of (r2).
In the proof of (r3) we need the following auxiliary result.
Since L is an MA language, then A is true in the interpretation of L. Thus #A is in W , and hence in G(U). Assume next that the least of those n for which
Conversely, if #A is in G(U), then it is in G n (U) for some n, so that #[¬(¬A)] is in G 9 n (U), and hence in G n+1 (U), and thus in G(U). This concludes the proof of (r0). To prove (r3), let A be a sentence of L. It follows from (3.
1) that #[¬A] is in G(U) iff #A is in F (U). Consider next the case when #[¬A] is in F (U). By (3.1) this holds iff #[¬(¬A)] is in G(U) iff (by (r0)) #A is in G(U). This ends the proof of (r3).
Let A and B be sentences of L. If #A or #B is in G(U), there is by (2.5) an n ∈ N 0 such that #A or #B is in G n (U). Thus #[A ∨ B] is in G 1 n (U), and hence in G(U).
Conversely, assume that #[A ∨ B] is in G(U). Then there is by (2.5) an n
Because L is an MA language, then A or B is true in the interpretation of L, i.e., #A or #B is in W , and hence in G(U). Assume next that the least of those n for which
is in G 1 n−1 (U), so that #A or #B is in G n−1 (U), and hence in G(U). The proofs for the validity of rules (r5)-(r7) are similar to that given above for rule (r4).
Consequently, #[A ∨ B] is in G(U) iff #A or #B is in G(U).

It follows from (3.1) that (a) #[
This concludes the proof of (r8).
at least for one numeral n ∈ X iff #T (n) is in F (U) at least for one numeral n ∈ X. This ends the proof of rule (r9). Similar reasoning as in the above proofs of (r8) and (r9) can be used to verify that rules (r10) and (r11) are valid.
Properties of G(U ) and F (U ) when U is consistent
In this section we shall prove some properties of G(U) and F (U), where U is consistent. They are used in [4] to prove the existence of consistent fixed points of G.
Thus #T (n) cannot be both in G(U) and in F (U), and hence not in G 0 (U) ∩ F (U), because the consistency of U implies that #A and #[¬A] cannot be both in U.
If U is empty, then none of the Gödel numbers
Assume next that U is not empty. Because U is consistent, it is a proper subset of D. Then rules (r1), (r8)-(r11), result (r0) and definitions (2.2) and (3.1) imply that not any of the above listed Gödel numbers is both in G 0 (U) and in F (U), and hence in G 0 (U) ∩ F (U).
The above results and the definition of G 0 (U) imply that the induction hypothesis:
, then #A or #B is in G n (U), and both #A and #B are in F (U) by (r4), so that #A or #B is in
, for otherwise both #A and #B are in G n (U), and at least one of #A and #B is in F (U), so that #A or #B is in n (U) ∩ F (U), then #A would be in G n (U) and #[¬(¬A)], or equivalently, by (r0), #A would be in F (U), so that #A would be in
Since it holds when n = 0, the above proof shows by induction that it holds for all n ∈ N 0 . If #A is in G(U), it is by (2.5) in G n (U) for some n ∈ N 0 . Because (h0) holds, then #A is not in F (U). Consequently, G(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅. Proof. (a) Consistency of the sets G(U λ ), λ ∈ α, follows from Lemma 4.2 because the sets U λ , λ ∈ α, are consistent. Because U µ ⊂ U ν whenever µ ∈ ν ∈ α, then G(U µ ) ⊆ G(U ν ) whenever µ ∈ ν ∈ α, by Lemma 4.3, whence the sequence (G(U λ )) λ∈α is increasing. This proves (a). Theorem 4.1. If V ∈ P is sound, there exists the smallest of those fixed points of G which contain V . This fixed point is the last member of the union of those transfinite sequences (U λ ) λ∈α of P which satisfy (C) (U λ ) λ∈α is strictly increasing, U 0 = V , and if 0 ∈ µ ∈ α, then U µ = λ∈µ G(U λ ).
The union (U λ ) λ∈γ of the transfinite sequences satisfying (C) can be characterized as follows (cf. [3] ).
(I) U 0 = V . If λ is in γ, then λ + 1 is in γ iff U λ ⊂ G(U λ ), in which case U λ+1 = G(U λ ).
If α is a limit ordinal, and λ is in γ for each λ ∈ α, then α is in γ, and U α = λ∈α U λ .
It follows from (I) that the sequence (U λ ) λ∈γ begins with sets U 0 = V , U n+1 = G(U n ), n = 0, 1, . . . , U ω = n∈ω U n , U ω+n+1 = G(U ω+n ), n = 0, 1, . . . , e.t.c., as long as the so defined sets exist and contain strictly previous sets. Because (U λ ) λ∈γ is a strictly increasing sequence of subsets of a countable set D, then γ is a countable ordinal. In this sense the smallest fixed point of G that contains V is determined by a countable recursion method. By [5, Corollary 3.1] this fixed point U is the smallest of all fixed points of G if V is a subset of W . Those sentences of L whose Gödel numbers are in U, or equivalently, in G(U), and their negations, whose Gödel numbers belong by (r3) to F (U), form an MA language L 0 which contains its truth predicate.
